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<Case Comment> 
The Swiss Primate Case: A Judicial Unicorn or Justice in Action? 




In 2016, a citizens’ initiative was launched in the Swiss Canton of Basel-Stadt, demanding that 
the rights catalogue in the Cantonal Constitution be complemented by a fundamental right to life 
and bodily and mental integrity for non-human primates. This initiative became the subject of a 
three-year legal dispute that ended with a decision by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court in Sep-
tember 2020, ruling that the initiative is legally valid and must be put to the people for a vote. 
This case note discusses the key developments in the dispute, including the ground-breaking de-
cision by the Constitutional Court of Basel-Stadt, which held that cantons are free to ‘expand the 
circle of rights holders beyond the anthropological barrier’. The authors – who have been in-
volved in the drafting of the initiative and have acted as legal advisers – offer first-hand insights 
into legal strategies and shed light on the importance of the case in the context of the ongoing ef-
forts to secure rights for primates around the world. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Human beings possess a range of legal rights that protect their fundamental interests. Among these 
are the right to life and the right to bodily and mental integrity.1 Chimpanzees, orangutans, ma-
caques, gibbons, and lemurs, on the other hand, have no such rights.2 This is despite the fact that, 
like human beings, they are primates who have an interest in being alive and being protected from 
bodily and mental harm.3 In 2016, the Swiss organization Sentience Politics launched a citizens’ 
initiative in the Swiss Canton (or state) of Basel-Stadt, demanding that the cantonal constitutional 
rights catalogue be amended to include a basic right to life and bodily and mental integrity for all 
non-human primates.4  
Efforts to put the primate rights initiative to a vote by the people of Basel-Stadt came to a 
halt when the Grand Council (the parliament of Basel-Stadt) declared the initiative invalid.5 The 
initiative, and the question of whether non-human primates should be granted certain basic rights, 
 
1 See, e.g., Arts 6 and 7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), New York, 
NY (US), 16 Dec. 1966, in force 23 Mar. 1976, available at: http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinter-
est/pages/ccpr.aspx. 
2 See, e.g., A. Staker, ‘Should Chimpanzees Have Standing? The Case for Pursuing Legal Personhood for 
Non-Human Animals’ (2017) 6(3) Transnational Environmental Law, pp. 485-507; A. Peters, ‘Liberté, 
Égalité, Animalité: Human–Animal Comparisons in Law’ (2016) 5(1) Transnational Environmental Law, 
pp. 25–53. Some limited exceptions are outlined at p. 18 below. 
3 See generally on primates C.P. Groves & J.R. Napier, ‘Primate (Mammal)’, in Encyclopaedia Britannica 
(2020), available at: https://www.britannica.com/animal/primate-mammal. 
4 Kanton Basel-Stadt, Kantonsblatt Archiv, ‘Grundrechte für Primaten’, 22 June 2016, available at: 
https://www.kantonsblatt-archiv.ch/articles/18163. 
5 Grand Council of Basel-Stadt, Decision, 10 Jan. 2018, Kantonsblatt no. 4, at p. 59. 
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then became the subject of a three-year legal dispute. This dispute led to a ground-breaking decision 
by the Constitutional Court of Basel-Stadt in early 2019, which ruled that the initiative was, for the 
most part, legally valid and that citizens should be allowed to vote on the question of whether to 
‘expand the circle of rights holders beyond the anthropological barrier’.6 After six members of the 
Grand Council appealed this decision, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court delivered a final verdict 
on 16 September 2020. The Court upheld the Cantonal Constitutional Court’s decision on the va-
lidity of the initiative and thereby paved the way for the first direct-democratic vote in the world 
on whether at least some non-human animals should be afforded fundamental rights.7 
In this case note, the authors – who were involved in drafting the initiative and acted as 
independent legal advisers in the court proceedings – discuss the key developments in the dispute 
and offer first-hand insights into the legal strategies behind the initiative and the court filings. By 
considering issues such as legal personhood under private versus public law, the protection of an-
imals through rights versus welfare measures, and the protection of animals in federal states, the 
authors also seek to add critical dimensions to ongoing efforts to secure rights for primates around 
the world. 
The case note unfolds as follows. In section 2, we provide context for the primate rights 
initiative by outlining the current state of animal welfare law in Switzerland and highlighting its 
shortcomings, especially with respect to protecting primates’ basic interests. In section 3, we then 
turn to the central strategic considerations behind the initiative and the key developments surround-
ing its launch and the proposed amendment to the cantonal Constitution. Section 4 then considers 
the decision by the cantonal authorities to declare the initiative invalid. This leads to a consideration 
 
6 Constitutional Court of Basel-Stadt, 15 Jan. 2019, VG.2018.1, para. 3.7.3 (our translation). 
7 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Judgment, 16 Sep. 2020, 1C_105/2019. 
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of the ground-breaking decision by the Cantonal Constitutional Court in Section 5, and the recent 
ruling by the Supreme Court to uphold that decision, in Section 6. Finally, in Section 7, we discuss 
why this case is relevant in a transnational context and what can be learned from the decision for 
the animal rights movement more broadly. 
 
2. ANIMAL WELFARE LAW IN SWITZERLAND 
The Swiss generally consider themselves as having one of the strictest legal regimes for animal 
welfare in the world.8 This claim is not entirely without merit. Switzerland has played a pioneering 
role in global animal law and ranks among the most progressive countries in the World Animal 
Protection Index.9 In 1992, for example, it became the first country to ban battery cages and the 
first to protect the dignity of non-human animals in its constitution.10 Just recently, Switzerland 
took the lead in banning the killing of lobsters without prior stunning, effectively banning boiling 
lobsters alive.11  
 
8 See, e.g., R. Schmidlin, ‘Neue Regelungen im Tierschutzgesetz’, St. Galler Tagblatt, 16 Dec. 2010, 
available at: https://www.tagblatt.ch/ostschweiz/wil/neue-regelungen-im-tierschutzgesetz-ld.439682. 
9 Animal Protection Index, ‘Switzerland’ (2020), available at: https://api.worldanimalprotection.org/coun-
try/switzerland. 
10 See Art. 120(2), Swiss Federal Constitution (1999), available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/19995395/index.html; M. Häne, B. Huber-Eicher & E. Fröhlich, ‘Survey of Laying Hen Hus-
bandry in Switzerland’ (2000) 56(1) World’s Poultry Science Journal, pp. 21-31, at 21.  
11 J. Calfas, ‘This Country Is Making It Illegal to Boil Live Lobsters’, TIME, 16 Jan. 2018, available at: 
https://time.com/5103892/switzerland-boil-lobsters; Art. 179a(1)(j), Swiss Animal Welfare Ordinance 
(2008), available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/de/classified-compilation/20080796/index.html. 
 5 
These laws suggest that Switzerland has a strong track record of protecting animals. In 
practice, however, Switzerland’s approach to the protection of animals is in many ways indistin-
guishable from other countries. For example, despite banning battery cages, factory farming is still 
a reality in Switzerland.12  
This is because the 2005 Swiss Animal Welfare Act (SAWA),13 which is the principal piece 
of legislation governing the protection of animals in the country, is based on a welfarist paradigm. 
One of SAWA’s guiding principles is that ‘[a]ny person who handles animals must ensure their 
well-being as far as the intended purpose permits’.14 Human purposes for using animals, in other 
words, take precedence over animals’ interests in their own well-being. Switzerland also still con-
siders animals to be property: while the Swiss Civil Code provides that animals are not legal ob-
jects, it states that, where no special rules apply, they ‘are subject to the provisions governing ob-
jects’.15  
 Non-human primates are subject to the same welfarist regime. While human primates enjoy 
a robust set of fundamental rights, including the right to life and to bodily and mental integrity,16 
 
12 Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture, ‘Eier’, 31 Mar. 2020, available at: https://www.blw.ad-
min.ch/blw/de/home/markt/marktbeobachtung/eier.html; Swiss Federal Office for Agriculture, ‘Agrarber-
icht 2019: Fleisch und Eier’ (2019), available at: https://www.agrarbericht.ch/de/markt/tierische-
produkte/fleisch-und-eier. 
13 Swiss Animal Welfare Act (2005), available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compila-
tion/20022103/index.html. 
14 Ibid., Art. 4(1)(b) (emphasis added). 
15 Art. 641a(2), Swiss Civil Code (1907), available at: https://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compila-
tion/19070042/index.html. 
16 Art. 10, Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 10 above. 
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the same fundamental interests of non-human primates are neither recognized nor protected by the 
law. This is despite the fact that all primates17 – human and non-human alike – are highly complex 
 
17 The interests and capacities-based approach to rights that has informed the primate rights initiative is not 
without its critics. Some have argued that this approach is ableist and threatens the rights of human beings 
who lack the relevant capacities: see, e.g., R.L. Cupp, ‘Cognitively Impaired Humans, Intelligent Animals, 
and Legal Personhood’, Pepperdine University Legal Studies Research Paper No. 12 (2016) pp. 1-56, avail-
able at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2775288. Others contend that, on this approach, only interests and 
capacities that are similar to those of humans warrant protection, and that, as a result, only animals who are 
like humans would be afforded rights: see especially M. Deckha, ‘Critical Animal Studies and Animal Law’ 
(2012) 18(2) Animal Law, pp. 207-36, at 231-4; T.L. Bryant, ‘Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: 
Must Animals Be like Humans to Be Legally Protected from Humans?’ (2007) 70(1) Law and Contempo-
rary Problems, pp. 207-54; C.A. MacKinnon, ‘Of Mice and Men: A Fragment on Animal Rights’ in J. 
Donovan and C.J. Adams (eds), The Feminist Care Tradition in Animal Ethics (Columbia University Press 
2007), pp. 316-33. We acknowledge this debate, but it is beyond the scope of this case note to consider this 
issue in detail. 
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beings,18 who have an essential interest in being alive, being free from pain, and having their phys-
ical and mental integrity respected.19  
Establishing the basic rights of non-human primates to life and to bodily and mental integ-
rity would entail official recognition and protection of their most essential interests. Any proposed 
infringements of these interests would require justification and be subject to a strict balancing of 
interests test, as is the case where human rights may be infringed.20 To justify infringing a primate’s 
rights, a proposed act would need to have a sound legal basis, represent a legitimate interest, and 
be proportionate (suitable and necessary to achieve a legitimate goal and to protect a weightier 
interest).21 Furthermore, rights in Switzerland are also considered to have a so-called Kerngehalt 
 
18 See A.Z. Rajala, et al., ‘Rhesusmonkeys (Macacamulatta) Do Recognize Themselves in the Mirror’ 
(2010) 5(1) PLoS ONE, pp. 1-8; M.W. de Veer, et al., ‘8-Year Longitudinal Study of Mirror Self-Recogni-
tion in Chimpanzees (Pan Troglodytes)’ (2003) 41(2) Neuropsychologia, pp. 229-34; J.J. Couchman, ‘Self-
Agency in Rhesus Monkeys’ (2012) 8 Biology Letters, pp. 9-41; W.A. Roberts, ‘Mental Time Travel: Ani-
mals Anticipate the Future’ (2007) 17(11) Current Biology, pp. 418-20; T. Suddendorf & M.C. Corballis, 
‘Behavioural Evidence for Mental Time Travel in Nonhuman Animals’ (2010) 215(2) Behavioural Brain 
Research, pp. 295-8. 
19 See P. Singer, Animal Liberation 2nd edn (Pimlico, 1990), pp. 15, 19; M. Nussbaum, ‘Beyond “Compas-
sion and Humanity”: Justice for Nonhuman Animals’, in C.R. Sunstein & M. Nussbaum (eds), Animal 
Rights: Current Debates and New Directions (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 300-19; T. Regan, ‘The 
Case for Animal Rights’, in P. Singer (ed.), In Defence of Animals (Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 13-26.  
20 R. Fasel et al., ‘Fundamental Rights for Primates: Policy Paper by Sentience Politics’ (2016), pp. 1-16, 
at 6, available at: https://ea-foundation.org/files/Fundamental-Rights-for-Primates.pdf. 
21 See Article 36 Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 10 above. 
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(core content), the violation of which cannot be justified under any circumstances.22 The core con-
tent of human beings’ right to life, for example, protects humans against targeted killing in circum-
stances where they pose no threat. Establishing equivalent rights for non-human primates would 
involve a true paradigm shift for these animals: they could not, as a rule, be killed for human pur-
poses, regardless of how important humans might consider these purposes to be.  
One might consider that a simple ban on the killing of primates in zoos and for research 
purposes would sufficiently protect their right to life, and that primates therefore do not need basic 
rights more generally. However, bans of this kind are specific, context-dependent, and only nega-
tively protect interests. In contrast, fundamental rights are general, applicable in myriad situations, 
and work positively toward realizing their beneficiaries’ interests.23 Another notable advantage of 
establishing rights for primates is the actionability and enforceability of such rights.24 As is the case 
in most other countries, the responsibility for the enforcement of Swiss laws that protect animals 
lies with underfunded agencies which may have different, and potentially conflicting, mandates 
(for example, environmental protection or enabling research or farming). While animal welfare 
protections could, in theory, also be enforced through human proxies, this mechanism is more 
commonly available with respect to the enforcement of fundamental rights. Infants or human be-
ings with certain disabilities, for example, may have their rights enforced in court by legal guardi-
ans.  
 
22 G. Biaggini, BV Kommentar, 2nd edn (Orell Füssli, 2017), Art. 36, at para. 45. 
23 C. Blattner, ‘Rethinking the 3Rs: From Whitewashing to Rights’, in K. Herrmann & K. Jayne (eds), 
Animal Experimentation: Working Towards a Paradigm Change (Brill, 2019), pp. 168-93, at 178–80. 




3. A CITIZENS’ INITIATIVE TO CHANGE THE LAW  
To reform this legal status quo, Sentience Politics decided to launch a citizens’ initiative. Citizens’ 
initiatives are direct democratic instruments that exist on both the federal and cantonal level in 
Switzerland and allow a group of citizens to form a so-called ‘initiative committee’ to propose a 
constitutional amendment. If the group manages to collect a sufficient number of signatures from 
other citizens within a given timeframe, then the proposal will be put to a binding vote by the 
citizenry as a whole.  
In the case of the primate rights initiative, Sentience Politics first had to consider whether 
the initiative should target constitutional change at the federal or cantonal level. Swiss law allows 
amendments to the Federal Constitution through citizens’ initiatives, but such amendments are dif-
ficult to achieve, as they require collecting 100,000 signatures and a vote by the majority of the 
people and the cantons.25 In contrast, citizens’ initiatives at the cantonal level require fewer signa-
tures (3,000 in the case of Basel-Stadt) and a majority vote by the people (as compared to a majority 
vote by the people and the cantons). It is this lower threshold that has made cantons the laboratories 
of direct democracy, and secured them a pioneering role in driving socio-political change. For 
example, various cantons, including Basel-Stadt, introduced voting rights for women long before 
the federal government did.26 
Of the 26 cantons of Switzerland, the urban canton of Basel-Stadt was chosen as the most 
suitable forum for the primate rights initiative due to it being one of the most progressive cantons 
 
25 Art. 139, Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 10 above. 
26 B. Studer, ‘Das Frauenstimm- und Wahlrecht in der Schweiz 1848-1971’ (2015) 26(2) Österreichische 
Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaften, pp. 14-40. 
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in the country, not least with respect to animal protection issues. Despite Basel-Stadt’s small size 
and population (just over 200,000 inhabitants), it is a hotspot for life sciences, and biomedical and 
pharmaceutical research, with Novartis and Roche – the second- and third-largest pharmaceutical 
companies worldwide27 – having their registered offices there. Furthermore, Basel Zoo owns an 
estimated 250 primates, which would all be affected by the initiative.28 For these reasons, Basel-
Stadt seemed a particularly promising canton to launch the primate rights initiative. 
A central conviction of Sentience Politics, the organization that launched the initiative, was 
that a citizens’ initiative should be used to ignite a broad, public debate on this fundamental ques-
tion of justice. For this purpose, Sentience Politics published a comprehensive policy paper on the 
issue in early 2016.29 At around this time, we began working as independent legal advisers for the 
initiative and produced a draft provision to be inserted into the cantonal Constitution, which we 
circulated among experts, including constitutional law and animal law experts. Questions that we 
grappled with included how detailed the proposed constitutional provision should be, and where 
the provision should be placed in the Constitution. We finally agreed that Article 11(2) of the Con-
stitution, which lists the basic rights guaranteed by the Canton such as humans’ right to life, bodily 
and mental integrity, freedom from torture, right to autonomy and security, and a ban on forced 
 
27 Roche, ‘Roche in Switzerland’ (2020), available at: https://www.roche.com/careers/country/switzer-
land/ch-your-job/roche_in_switzerland.htm; Novartis, ‘Novartis in Switzerland’ (2020), available at: 
https://www.novartis.com/sites/www.novartis.com/files/passport-novartis-in-switzerland.pdf. 
28 Estimate based on a personal visit and the Zoo’s website, available at: www.zoobasel.ch. 
29 Fasel et al., n. 20 above. 
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labour and human trafficking, should be complemented with a new provision in the following 
terms:30     
[This constitution guarantees, among others:]  
the right of non-human primates to life and bodily and mental integrity.31  
4. EARLY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PRIMATE CASE 
Following the launch of the initiative in June 2016 and the collection of the required 3,000 signa-
tures, the initiative was submitted to the cantonal Executive Council of Basel-Stadt for examina-
tion. The Executive Council undertook an initial review to ensure that the proposed reform was not 
unconstitutional or impossible to implement. As a result of this review, the Executive Council con-
cluded that the initiative violated federal law.32 Shortly thereafter, in early 2018, the Grand Council 
of Basel-Stadt affirmed the Executive Council’s decision, and declared the initiative invalid.33  
In their reports, the Executive Council and Grand Council of Basel-Stadt first stated that 
the initiative contravened the federal Civil Code. The Civil Code, they held, determines exhaust-
 
30 Art. 11, Constitution of Basel-Stadt (2005), available at: https://www.gesetzessammlung.bs.ch/app/de/ 
texts_of_law/111.100. 
31 Sentience Politics, ‘Grundrechte für Primaten’ (2020), available at: https://sentience-politics.org/de/poli-
tik/grundrechte-fuer-primaten-basel (authors’ translation). In German, the wording is: ‘Diese Verfassung 
gewährleistet überdies (…) das Recht von nichtmenschlichen Primaten auf Leben und auf körperliche und 
geistige Unversehrtheit.’ 
32 Executive Council Basel, Kantonale Volksinitiative ‘Grundrechte für Primaten’ Bericht über die 
rechtliche Zulässigkeit und das weitere Verfahren, Report, 13 Dec. 2017, GD/P171389, pp. 1-10.  
33 Grand Council of Basel-Stadt, n. 5 above, p. 59. 
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ively who qualifies as a legal person, and therefore leaves no room for legal personhood for ani-
mals. Specifically, they referred to Article 11, which establishes the legal capacity of natural per-
sons,34 and to Article 53, which regulates the legal capacity of legal persons.35 These exhaustive 
provisions, they held, preclude the Cantons from establishing legal personhood for non-human 
primates and affording them legal rights.36 Secondly, the Councils held that the power to protect 
animals is an exclusive competence of the federal government. Article 80 of the Federal Constitu-
tion determines that ‘[t]he Confederation shall legislate on the protection of animals’, while the 
Cantons are responsible for ‘[t]he enforcement of the regulations’.37  
In February 2018, the team behind the initiative commenced legal proceedings before the 
Constitutional Court of the Canton of Basel-Stadt, challenging the Grand Council’s decision. In 
their appeal, they countered the Councils’ first conclusion by arguing that the definition of legal 
personhood in the Civil Code does not apply to public law matters, such as the present matter. The 
Civil Code regulates legal relations between private parties. This means that the federal government 
can issue regulations that pursue private law objectives and traditionally belong to the private law 
sphere, particularly if these measures create or restore the prerequisites for a functioning private 
legal transaction.38 Accordingly, although the Civil Code determines legal personhood, it does so 
only with respect to legal relations between private entities. The team behind the initiative then 
argued that, in contrast, legal personhood for the purpose of conferring basic rights is conceptually 
 
34 Art. 11(1), Swiss Civil Code, n. 15 above. 
35 Ibid. Art. 53. 
36 Executive Council Basel, n. 32 above, p. 6. 
37 Art. 80(1) and (3), Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 10 above. 
38 Biaggini, n. 22 above, Art. 122, at para. 3. 
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distinct from legal personhood, as provided for by the Civil Code. In particular, legal personhood 
in the former context is not civil (or private) in nature, as it is not designed to enable participation 
in private legal transactions. Rather, legal personhood for the purpose of establishing basic rights 
is a genuinely public and, more specifically, constitutional matter, as it pertains to the relationship 
between primates and public bodies. The team behind the initiative argued that in this public law 
context, cantons are free to establish legal personhood for any type of entity, including primates. 
With respect to the Councils’ second conclusion that the initiative violated federal public 
law, the initiative’s case on appeal accepted that Article 80 of the Swiss Constitution gives the 
federal government broad legislative competence in all matters of animal protection, such as the 
keeping and care of animals; experiments on animals; procedures carried out on living animals; the 
use of animals; and their killing. These areas, in which the federal government enjoys comprehen-
sive competence,39 are not exhaustively enumerated but operate as inhaltliche Leitplanken (con-
tent-based guidelines).40 However, the federal government’s competence in these areas is primarily 
focused on making animals and their bodies accessible for humans, by prescribing how animals 
may be kept, bred, used, traded, and killed.41 Mechanisms to protect animals from these acts are 
subject to a skewed balance of interest test, which considers whether use of the animal is ‘neces-
sary’ from a human perspective, rather than ‘proportionate’ from a species-neutral perspective.42 
 
39 Ibid., Art. 80, at n. 6 above. 
40 L. Schärmeli & A. Griffel, ‘Artikel 80 BV’, in B. Waldmann, E.M. Belser & A. Epiney (eds), 
Bundesverfassung: Basler Kommentar (Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 2015), Art. 80, at n. 17. 
41 See Art. 80, Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 9 above. 
42 Art. 4(2), Swiss Animal Welfare Act, n. 13 above; see also M. Michel, ‘Tierschutzgesetzgebung im 
Rechtsvergleich’, in M. Michel, D. Kühne & J. Hänni (eds), Animal Law: Tier und Recht (Dike, 2012), 
pp. 594-624, at 600. 
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This shows that the federal government’s competence to protect animals – and the SAWA – is 
primarily utilitarian in nature.43 The federal government, acting on the basis of Article 80 of the 
Constitution, is bound by and inherently anchored to this ‘use paradigm’.44 Consequently, animals’ 
lives are effectively not protected under Swiss law,45 and ending them does not require justifica-
tion.46 This federal competence in matters of animal protection can be contrasted with the deonto-
logical framework on which traditional concepts of fundamental rights are based, and is conceptu-
ally different from the legal rights regime which the primate rights initiative seeks to establish. 
Another critical argument made on appeal to the Constitutional Court was that, under Swiss 
law, citizens must be allowed to vote on an initiative when there is doubt as to its legality.47 This 
duty is encapsulated by the principle of in dubio pro populo. It was argued that this fundamental 
principle at the core of Swiss democracy and law would be violated if the Court were to uphold the 
Parliament’s decision to declare the initiative invalid.48 
 
 
43 S. Stucki, Grundrechte Für Tiere (Nomos, 2016), p. 110. 
44 See further W. Kymlicka, ‘Social Membership: Animal Law Beyond the Property/Personhood Impasse’ 
(2017) 40(1) Dalhousie Law Journal, pp. 123-55, at 148. 
45 Art. 1 a contrario Swiss Animal Welfare Act, n. 13 above. 
46 Stucki, n. 43 above, p. 103. 
47 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Judgment, 14 Dec. 2016, BGE 143 I 129, at p. 132, para. 2.2; Swiss Federal 
Supreme Court, Judgment, 10 Jul. 1985, BGE 111 Ia 292, at pp. 299–300, para. 3c/cc. 
48 Arts 34 & 36(2), Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 10 above. 
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5. THE DECISION BY THE CANTONAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
On 15 January 2019, the Constitutional Court of the Canton of Basel-Stadt, in a much-awaited 
decision, delivered a ground-breaking judgment in which it sided with the appellants.49 At the heart 
of the Court’s ruling was the question of whether the primate rights initiative was inconsistent with 
federal law and therefore invalid.  
The Court first considered whether the Civil Code precludes animals from having funda-
mental rights. It ruled that if the initiative sought to expand legal personhood of natural or legal 
persons under the Civil Code, or to establish distinct personhood for animals under the Code (as a 
sort of ‘animal personhood’), this would contravene the Code and require an amendment to the 
Code.50 However, the Court accepted the appellants’ argument that the Civil Code is directed at 
relations between private citizens, rather than at the conceptually distinct relationship between pri-
vate entities and the state, which is governed by public law. Because the initiative sought reform 
in the realm of public law – essentially with respect to the relationship between individuals and the 
state – the Court held that there was no conflict with civil/private law. In the striking words of the 
Court, within the realm of public law, cantons are free to ‘expand the circle of rights holders beyond 
the anthropological barrier’.51 
The Court then considered whether the initiative concerns animal protection, which falls 
within the exclusive competence of the federal government, as stipulated by the Federal Constitu-
tion.52 The Court again found for the appellants, holding that the initiative does not violate the 
 
49 Constitutional Court of Basel-Stadt, n. 6 above. 
50 Ibid., para. 3.3.  
51 Ibid., para. 3.7.3 (authors’ translation). 
52 Art. 80, Swiss Federal Constitution, n. 10 above. 
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Constitution. However, the Court arrived at this conclusion via a different route. The Court did not 
accept that there is a fundamental difference between welfare protection and fundamental rights, 
and considered that such a distinction conflates ends with means.53 However, the Court held that 
the initiative seeks to better protect primates,54 and that it uses the instrument of fundamental rights 
to achieve this aim.55 In other words, rights are not categorically different from welfare protections; 
they are simply a means to achieve better welfare for animals. Viewed in this way, the Court con-
sidered that the primate rights initiative would conflict with federal law only if it were to force 
private individuals to observe stricter standards than those provided by the SAWA.56 It would not 
be permissible, for example, for the initiative to affect the Basel Zoo, which is a private company. 
Rather than declaring the initiative invalid, however, the Court held that there is nothing in 
the federal Constitution or the SAWA that prevents cantons from imposing on their own authorities 
stricter standards than those imposed federally on private individuals, including by creating funda-
mental rights for primates.57 Cantons have the right to introduce more onerous standards for their 
own institutions as part of their organizational autonomy. Cantonal public organizations, such as 
public hospitals or cantonal universities (for example, the University of Basel) could therefore be 
required to observe primates’ basic rights.58 Because Basel-Stadt has the authority to establish 
rights for primates that are binding on its own authorities, the Court held that the initiative must be 
 
53 Constitutional Court of Basel-Stadt, n. 6 above, para. 3.8.2. 
54 Or, more precisely, to ‘tighten’ animal protection: see ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid., paras. 3.8.3, 4.2.1, 4.2.3. 
57 Ibid., para. 3.8.3. 
58 With the caveat that these rights would have to be weighed against researchers’ right to scientific freedom, 
see ibid., para. 4.2.1. 
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put to the vote of the people. The Court considered that the question of whether rights should be 
established for primates is an entirely political (as opposed to legal) question that the people are 
best placed to decide.59 
Finally, the Court addressed the question of how the primate rights initiative could be im-
plemented, which demonstrates that it took seriously the initiative’s demands. The Court found that 
primates would need legal proxies – a task that could be carried out by special officers at the can-
tonal department for veterinary services, by the agency mandated with protecting children and 
adults, by an ombudsperson, or by an independent attorney for primates. The Court added that 
primates’ rights could also be exercised collectively, such as by vesting organizations with the right 
to file suit and appeal decisions, in line with the federal Code of Criminal Procedure.60 
 
6. THE DECISION BY THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT 
In February 2019, a few weeks after the judgment of the Constitutional Court was published, six 
members of the Grand Council of Basel-Stadt appealed the decision in the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court. They argued that if parts of the initiative are invalid, the initiative must either be interpreted 
to fit within constitutional parameters or its text must be changed by the cantonal authorities. The 
first approach, they reasoned, was not possible because it would undermine the primary purpose of 
the initiative (namely, granting fundamental rights to primates). They argued that the second ap-
proach was equally impossible because the text would have to be changed completely. As such, 
the initiative would be deprived of its purpose and have no practical effect. The proponents of the 
 
59 Ibid., para. 3.8.3. 
60 Ibid., para. 4.3. 
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initiative countered the appeal on both procedural and substantive grounds. Our focus here is on 
the latter. 
 Regarding the appellants’ first argument, the proponents of the initiative argued that there 
was no need to interpret the initiative to fit within constitutional parameters because the initiative 
does not touch on any of the legislative competences of the federal government. There is a differ-
ence, the proponents argued, between norms that establish legislative competences and norms that 
establish basic rights.61 Specifically, establishing rights is a competence-neutral endeavour, and 
because of this, conflict over competences cannot arise where the issue of basic rights is concerned. 
In the alternative, the proponents argued that the initiative can be interpreted in accordance 
with the Federal Constitution, as was done by the Cantonal Constitutional Court. Accordingly, even 
if the Supreme Court were to follow the Cantonal Constitutional Court’s judgment that the initia-
tive can only affect public cantonal authorities, the initiative must be upheld because it is partially 
valid, and, if necessary, could also be rewritten in small parts.62 Even if this was necessary, the 
initiative would still satisfy the primary goal of establishing basic rights for primates. As the Can-
tonal Constitutional Court recognized, the initiative would still have practical consequences by 
changing how cantonal authorities, such as hospitals or universities, treat primates. However, the 
proponents argued, even if the initiative were purely theoretical in nature and did not have a single 
practical effect, it would still be valid, and have to be put to a vote. This is because, according to 
long-standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, citizens’ initiatives do not need to have practical 
effect to be legally valid. For these reasons, the proponents argued that, in order to comply with 
the in dubio pro populo principle, the Court must declare the initiative legally valid. 
 
61 Biaggini, n. 22 above, Arts. 42-136, Vorbemerkung. 
62 See Swiss Federal Supreme Court, Judgment, 26 Sep. 1984, BGE 110 Ia 176. 
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On 16 September 2020, exactly three years after submission of the citizens’ initiative, the 
first (public law) chamber of the Supreme Court handed down its decision in a rare public hearing 
that took place on the same day.63 In its decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Cantonal Consti-
tutional Court’s ruling, thereby rejecting the appellants’ claims about the initiative’s invalidity. 
The Supreme Court largely affirmed the reasoning of the Cantonal Constitutional Court. 
After setting aside the procedural concerns that had been raised by the proponents of the initiative,64 
the Court moved on to determine whether the initiative was consistent with federal law or whether 
it could be interpreted as such. The Court stated that this question was to be determined based on 
the wording of the proposed amendment to the Constitution, although it would also be possible to 
consider explanations included in the initiative sheet (which contains the proposed amendment, a 
list of the members of the initiative committee, the reasons for the amendment, and a form that can 
be signed by citizens) and to determine how a reasonable citizen would understand the initiative. 
Invoking the principle of in dubio pro populo, the Court reasoned that the initiative would have to 
be declared valid as long as it was possible to interpret it in a way that is not incompatible with 
federal law.65 
Applying these considerations, the Court found that, based on the initiative’s wording, it 
was clear that the initiative aimed to create fundamental rights to life and to integrity for non-human 
 
63 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, n. 7 above. 
64 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, n. 7 above, at pp. 5-6, para. 1.2. N. Jecker, ‘Höchst zweifelhafte 
Finanzierung: Kanton bezahlt Grossräten Beschwerde gegen Affen-Rechte,’ Basler Zeitung, 19 Nov. 2020, 
available at: https://www.bazonline.ch/kanton-bezahlt-grossraeten-beschwerde-gegen-affen-rechte-
986041909486. 
65 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, n. 7 above, at p. 8, para. 6.2. 
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primates. It emphasized that cantons do in fact have the power to create new fundamental rights 
that go beyond minimum standards guaranteed by the rights catalogue in the Federal Constitution. 
Following the Cantonal Court’s reasoning, the Supreme Court held that such fundamental rights 
are a matter of public law rather than private law because they primarily concern the relationship 
between individuals and the state rather than the relationship between individuals. The narrow un-
derstanding of legal subjecthood in the context of civil/private law is therefore inapplicable and 
does not prevent the Canton from extending fundamental rights to beings other than humans.66  
The Court emphasized in this respect that the initiative does not aim to extend existing 
human constitutional rights to animals, but instead seeks to create special fundamental rights for 
non-human primates.67 The emphasis on this difference is interesting not only because it was not 
strictly necessary for the Court’s decision, but also because the initiators never drew this distinc-
tion. Furthermore, it can be contrasted with a recent trend in animal rights scholarship which em-
phasizes the overlaps (rather than differences) between human and animal rights.68  
Be that as it may, the Court concluded that because the initiative would only bind the Can-
ton’s own bodies, the federal Parliament’s exclusive competence to legislate in civil/private law 
 
66 Ibid. at pp. 8-11, paras 7.1-8.3. 
67 Ibid. at pp. 11, para. 8.2. 
68 See, e.g., A. Cochrane, ‘From Human Rights to Sentient Rights’ (2013) Critical Review of International 
Social and Political Philosophy, 16(5), pp. 655-75; J. Wills, ‘Human Rights and Animal Rights: A Syner-
gistic Approach’ Conference paper delivered at the European Animal Rights Law Conference 2019, Cam-
bridge, 15 Sep. 2019. 
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matters is not violated.69 In fact, the Supreme Court went further than the Cantonal Court, suggest-
ing that while private individuals could not be directly bound by primate rights on the cantonal 
level, it is possible that they would be indirectly affected by the increased level of protection ac-
corded to primates.70 
Finally, the Court rejected the appellants’ argument that applying the initiative solely to 
public bodies would change its original purpose and therefore amount to an illegitimate reinterpre-
tation of the initiative. Drawing on the explanations provided in the initiative sheet, the Court found 
that although the initiative may have implied applicability to private individuals, it was clear that 
even a more limited scope of application (namely, to cantonal entities only) would still serve the 
initiative’s original purpose: to extend fundamental legal rights to primates.71 Although the sheet 
may therefore have falsely suggested that the initiative would have immediate practical implica-
tions for primates, which are currently only kept by private entities in Basel-Stadt, the Court con-
sidered that the initiative could nevertheless protect primates in the future. 
 
7. TRANSNATIONAL RELEVANCE OF THE DECISION 
The decisions by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court and the Cantonal Constitutional Court are part 
of a recent wave of judicial decisions around the world that explicitly deal with the question of 
whether non-human beings deserve basic rights akin to human rights.72 This is because Switzerland 
 
69 Swiss Federal Supreme Court, n. 7 above, at pp. 9, 12, paras 7.1, 8.3. 
70 Ibid. at pp. 12, 14, paras 8.3, 9.2. 
71 Ibid. n. 7 above, at pp. 13, para. 9.1. 
72 See, e.g., Staker, n. 2 above. 
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is not the only jurisdiction in which non-human animals lack fundamental legal rights. In fact, in 
almost no country do non-human primates, let alone other animals, possess such rights.73 
 However, the legal status quo is slowly changing. Some of the most prominent recent ani-
mal rights decisions include a 2014 ruling from India which held that the right to life protected by 
the Indian Constitution also extends to the life of non-human species;74 a 2016 decision from Ar-
gentina granting a writ of habeas corpus to a chimpanzee who was found to be a legal person with 
a right to life;75 and a 2020 judgment from Pakistan which held that animals’ natural right to life 
must be respected.76  
 In addition to these cases, the Swiss case also bears resemblance to the work of the Nonhu-
man-Rights Project (NhRP), which has been filing habeas corpus writs for non-human animals in 
the United States (US).77 There are, however, also some differences between the Swiss initiative 
and the work of the NhRP as well as that of other animal rights organizations around the world.  
Firstly, the Swiss initiative focuses not only on great apes (as the NhRP and other animal 
rights projects have until recently), but on a larger category of primates. The Swiss approach is 
 
73 See Animal Protection Index (2020), available at: https://api.worldanimalprotection.org/# (which does 
not include granting fundamental rights to animals as a factor influencing how advanced states’ animal laws 
are). 
74 Animal Welfare Board of India v. A Nagaraja, et al. [2014] Supreme Court of India 2014 (5) SCJ 
614. 
75 [2016] Tercer Juzgado de Garantías Mendoza P-72.254/15, Ana María Hernández tr, available at: 
https://www.nonhumanrights.org/content/uploads/2016/12/Chimpanzee-Cecilia_translation- 
FINAL-for-website.pdf. 
76 [2020] Islamabad High Court W.P. No.1155/2019, Athar Minallah CJ. 
77 Nonhuman Rights Project, ‘Litigation’, available at: https://www.nonhumanrights.org/litigation/. 
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based on evidence that all primates possess the capacities and interests for holding the rights to life 
and to bodily and mental integrity. Secondly, because Switzerland is a civil law country, legal 
change is not primarily effected through courts, but through legislation. Given Switzerland’s long 
tradition as a direct democracy, referenda and citizens’ initiatives are particularly common tools 
for citizens to contribute to and participate in lawmaking processes.  
The judgments of the Constitutional Court of Basel-Stadt and the Swiss Federal Supreme 
Court are therefore not the only cases that deal explicitly with the question of fundamental legal 
rights for animals. However, they represent a major and unique success for non-human rights ad-
vocates around the world. In particular, the fact that the continental European legal tradition has so 
far resisted conferring basic rights on beings who are not human (or corporations) presented no 
barrier to the courts’ rulings. In contrast to other courts,78 the Swiss courts therefore accepted that 
the concept of fundamental rights-holdership can be extended beyond existing categories of rights-
holders. Furthermore, the courts accepted that non-human primates can, in principle, be holders of 
fundamental legal rights. In contrast to other courts, they did not question whether primates possess 
seemingly ‘relevant’ capacities, such as self-awareness, autonomy, or the capacity to bear duties.79 
In doing so, the Swiss courts may have also opened the door for the recognition of rights of other 
animals. Finally, the Swiss decisions support the view that requirements for fundamental rights-
holdership, and the corresponding definition of legal subjecthood, may vary from one area of law 
to another within the same legal system. 
 
78 See, e.g., Tilikum et al. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, et al. [2012] United States District Court, 
Southern District of California, pp. 4-7. 
79 See, e.g., Matters Nonhuman Rights Project v. Patrick C. Lavery, et al. [2017] Supreme Court of New 
York, Appellate Division, First Judicial Department, Webber J, p. 10. 
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To our knowledge, the Swiss rulings are the first of their kind to specifically address the 
relationship between animal rights and federalism. As discussed above, the courts endorsed the 
view that cantons are free to recognize animals as rights-holders even when the federal system does 
not. This finding may help lead the way for similar constitutional amendments in other federal 
jurisdictions, such as the US, India, or Germany. 
 
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
On 16 September 2020, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court paved the way for the first ever direct-
democratic vote on whether some animals should be granted basic rights to life and bodily and 
mental integrity. Together with the ground-breaking ruling of the Constitutional Court of Basel-
Stadt, this should be hailed internationally as an important success for the animal rights movement.  
Among the numerous factors that were critical for this success were: a commitment on the 
part of individual residents in Basel-Stadt in whose name the initiative was submitted; a core group 
of people dedicated to arguing the case, with substantive expertise; respectful and reliable cooper-
ation and mutual support; and, finally, sufficient funding. These insights and the arguments made 
in court, as discussed in this case note, can serve to further inform animal rights advocacy and 
pending cases in other countries to secure basic rights for non-human animals. 
Interestingly, in the Swiss case, it would not have been possible for the courts to dismiss 
the idea of extending fundamental rights to life and bodily and mental integrity to primates without 
also limiting the political rights of the citizens of Basel-Stadt. In this case, the principle of in dubio 
pro populo therefore also meant in dubio pro animale: in case of doubt, the people, not public 
officials, should be the ones to decide whether they want to ‘expand the circle of rights holders 
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beyond the anthropological barrier.’80 Whether the people of Basel-Stadt are prepared to cast the 
first democratic vote in favour of protecting non-human primates’ most basic interests will be seen 
in late 2021 or early 2022, when the vote is expected to take place. 
 
 
80 Constitutional Court of Basel-Stadt, n. 6 above, at para. 3.7.3. 
